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NOTES
A Bold Reaffirmation? Planned Parenthood v. Casey Opens the
Door for States to Enact New Laws to Discourage Abortion
Abortion-the very word stirs deep and intense passions among
many Americans1 as well as bitter animosity between persons on oppos-
ing sides of the issue.2 The names chosen by the parties to the contro-
versy reflect their views as to what is at stake. "Pro-Choice" partisans
view the issue as one of reproductive freedom implicating the right to
personal autonomy over one's body.3 "Pro-Life" supporters see abortion
as the destruction of a person possessing human rights.4 Since the latter
part of the nineteenth century, legislative bodies have dealt with these
conflicting opinions employing a variety of laws restricting abortion or
banning it altogether.5 But it has been left to the judicial system in its
role as a counter-majoritarian institution to declare what right, if any, a
woman has under the Constitution to obtain an abortion. In 1972, in
Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that a woman has a constitutional
right to an abortion, free from state interference in the early stages of
pregnancy.6 The Court constructed a framework that attempted to bal-
ance the interests of the pregnant woman, the unborn fetus, and the
state.7 Roe marked the beginning of a bitter struggle in the Court over
the nature of the regulations states may impose and the point at which
states may limit or prohibit abortions. The Roe framework has been the
subject of bitter attacks both by abortion opponents and members of the
Court itself.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey8 provided the Court with an opportu-
nity to issue a definitive statement on the status of abortion rights in the
wake of uncertainties created by the Court's changing composition. It
was widely expected that the more conservative members of the Court
1. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 6 (1990).
2. Id. at 239.
3. Id. at 137-38. Professor Tribe notes that as pregnancy progresses and the fetus devel-
ops, most Americans, including those who favor a woman's right to choose abortion, admit
that two beings-the mother and the developing fetus-are involved in the issue. Id. at 138.
4. Id. at 115.
5. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 138-40 (1973).
6. Id. at 152-53.
7. Id. at 162-63. The Roe Court designated the start of each new trimester of a preg-
nancy as the points at which the various interests of the state and the fetus become compelling.
Id.; see infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
8. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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would seize the opportunity to overrule Roe by declaring that states may
enact virtually any abortion restrictions so long as they are rationally
related to legitimate state interests.9 A wildcard in the calculus was
newly appointed Justice Clarence Thomas, voting in his first abortion
case on the Court. Yet it was Justice Kennedy, who previously had sided
with the conservative bloc opposing the Roe framework, who provided
the pivotal vote in Casey to reaffirm several essential aspects of the Roe
holding. ° While nominally upholding parts of Roe, the Casey Court left
many issues unresolved, thereby creating the prospect of even more divi-
sive court battles in coming years.11
The Supreme Court in Casey reaffirmed the basic right to abortion,
but indicated that it will tolerate greater limits on its availability than at
any time since Roe. 2 Only one vote short of overturning Roe, the Casey
Court cast further doubt on the future of the right to abortion as states
continue to enact more restrictive statutes. Adding to the uncertainty is
the adoption by three Justices of the "undue burden" standard of re-
view, 3 a significant departure from the Roe Court's application of strict
scrutiny to state laws criminalizing abortion.
This Note examines abortion rights as defined in Roe.14 The Note
then traces the aftermath of Roe, analyzing the series of post-Roe deci-
sions that initially reaffirmed' 5 but subsequently narrowed abortion
rights, even to the point of questioning Roe's validity.' 6 The Note con-
cludes that while the Court in Casey nominally upheld the fundamental
nature of the right to abortion prior to fetus viability, 7 further erosion of
9. David G. Savage, The Rescue of Roe vs. Wade, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 1992, at Al,
A28.
10. Id. Justice Kennedy, who joined the plurality in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 513-22, (1989), surprised Chief Justice Rehnquist with his insistence on
realffrming the fundamental right to abortion. See infra note 144.
11. The Casey decision did not satisfy either side of the abortion issue. "Pro-choice polit-
ical organizations lamented Casey as leaving Roe an empty shell. Abortion opponents saw the
Casey joint opinion as the treachery of two Reagan appointees and a Bush appointee who
should have been reliable votes against Roe, affording pitifully little latitude for new state
antiabortion legislation." Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term: Forward:
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 33 (1992). Professor Sullivan
noted that each position has merit, but both are overstated. Id. at 34.
12. See infra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.
13. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820 (plurality opinion).
14. See infra notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 104-18 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 119-40 and accompanying text.
17. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the Court upheld a Missouri
statute defining viability as "that stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child
may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive sys-
tems." Id. at 63.
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Roe is likely as states test the limits of Casey's less stringent and less
precisely defined undue burden standard."8 As a result of Casey, ob-
taining an abortion probably will become even more difficult and more
expensive in many states with fewer facilities willing or able to satisfy
new state requirements. This will leave many women without a real
choice whether to continue unwanted pregnancies, effectively rendering
the rights guaranteed under Roe meaningless.19
In Roe, the Court held that the right to abortion in the early stages
of pregnancy is protected by the Constitution. In an ongoing struggle
between states and the Court, it applied strict scrutiny, the highest level
of judicial review, to strike down state laws that required women seeking
abortions to be given detailed descriptions of fetal development. In
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,2 ° de-
cided in 1986, the Court held unconstitutional a Pennsylvania law requir-
ing that women seeking abortions be given information about possible
physical and psychological side-effects, the probable gestational age of
the fetus, and sources of funding to help cover the costs of childbirth.21
Despite the setback in Thornburgh, Pennsylvania amended its abortion
statute to include new requirements similar to those previously struck
down.22 The 1988 and 1989 amendments to the Pennsylvania Abortion
Control Act23 added new provisions including informed consent with a
twenty-four hour waiting period,24 parental consent, 25 spousal notifica-
18. See infra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing the undue burden standard).
19. Sarah Weddington, the attorney for the Roe plaintiffs, described her feelings about the
Casey decision:
I can't help thinking of the Cheshire cat in Alice in Wonderland, sitting on a tree
branch but disappearing part by part. The protection of Roe is disappearing before
our very eyes. Pennsylvania will soon begin enforcing the restrictions the Court has
stamped with its approval. Other states that want to pass those same measures know
that they are enforceable.
SARAH WEDDINGTON, A QUESTION OF CHOICE 287 (1992); see infra note 175 and accompa-
nying text.
20. 476 U.S. 747 (1986); see infra note 146.
21. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762; see infra note 38 (discussing appliction of strict scrutiny
review).
22. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1328 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992).
23. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3201-3220 (1983 & Supp. 1992).
24. Section 3205(a)(1) requires that the referring or performing physician inform a wo-
man considering an abortion of the nature of the procedure, the risks and alternatives, the
probable gestational age of the fetus, and the medical risks of carrying a child to term. Id.
§ 3205(a)(1). Section 3205(a)(2) requires that at least 24 hours prior to the abortion, a physi-
cian or counselor inform a woman that medical benefits may be available to cover various
expenses associated with childbirth, that the father of the child is liable to assist in support,
and that the state health department publishes information about fetal development along with
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tion,26 and reporting and public disclosure by facilities performing abor-
tions.2 7 The Act also included a medical emergency exception to the
informed consent, parental consent, and notification requirements in cer-
tain situations.2 8
Five abortion clinics and one physician challenged the constitution-
lists of agencies offering alternatives to abortion. Id. § 3205(a)(2). Prior to the abortion, the
woman must certify in writing that the required information has been provided. Id.
§ 3205(a)(3).
25. Section 3206 requires the informed consent of at least one parent for an unemanci-
pated woman under age 18 seeking an abortion, but it also provides a judicial bypass option, A
court may authorize an abortion in the absence of parental or guardian consent after determin-
ing that the woman is mature and capable of giving informed consent and that she has in fact
given consent. If the pregnant woman lacks the maturity to give informed consent, a court
may also authorize an abortion, if it determines that an abortion would be "in her best inter-
ests." A woman who has been adjudged incompetent may not receive an abortion regardless
of her age without the consent of her guardian. Id. § 3206.
26. Section 3209 of the Act requires a married woman to sign a statement that she has
notified her husband of her intentions before undergoing the procedure. The section includes
exceptions to the notification requirement if the husband is not the father, if the husband
cannot be located, if the pregnancy is the result of a reported spousal sexual assault, or if the
woman has reason to believe that notifying her husband is likely to lead to the infliction of
bodily injury by the spouse or another person. The section states that the purpose of the
requirement is "to further the Commonwealth's interest in promoting the integrity of the mari-
tal relationship and to protect a spouse's interests in having children within marriage and in
protecting prenatal life of that spouse's child." Id. § 3209.
27. Section 3207 requires that a facility performing abortions file reports stating its name
and address, the name and address of any parent, subsidiary, or affiliated organizations, corpo-
rations, or associations, and the name and address of any such related entities having "contem-
poraneous commonality of ownership, beneficial interest, directorship or officership with any
other facility." Id. § 3207. Reports filed by facilities receiving state funding are deemed public
information, while those filed by facilities not receiving state money are available only "to law
enforcement officials, the State Board of Medicine, and the State Board of Osteopathic
Medicine for use in the performance of their official duties." Id.
Section 3214 requires that reports be filed for each abortion without identifying the pa-
tient. The reports must include the names of the physician performing the abortion, the con-
curring physician, the second physician, the facility where the abortion was performed, and the
referring physician. Id. § 3214(a)(1). The section also requires the reporting of the residence
of the woman, her age, the number of prior pregnancies and prior abortions, the gestational
age of the fetus, the type of procedure used, pre-existing medical conditions, the basis for
medical judgment that a medical emergency existed to excuse compliance with any provision
of the chapter, whether the abortion was performed on a married woman, and, if so, whether
the spouse was notified. When a medically necessary third trimester abortion is performed, the
section requires that the physician report the basis for his or her judgment that an abortion was
medically necessary and the weight of the aborted child. Id. § 3214(a)(2)-(a)(12).
28. The statute defines a medical emergency as:
[t]hat condition which, on the basis of the physician's good faith clinical judgment, so
complicates the medical condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immedi-
ate abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or for which a delay will create
serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily function.
Id. § 3203.
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ality of the amendments on due process grounds,29 seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief.30 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that all of the provisions except for certain
reporting requirements violated the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and entered a permanent injunction against their
enforcement.31
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
the district court on all but the spousal notification requirement, holding
the other provisions constitutional.32 In analyzing the restrictions, the
court of appeals applied the undue burden standard of review first articu-
lated by Justice O'Connor in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health (Akron i).33 The court of appeals noted that recent Supreme
Court opinions had raised questions about the validity of Roe and the
proper standard of review to apply in cases dealing with abortion.34 The
court concluded that a majority of Supreme Court Justices no longer
adhered to the strict scrutiny standard of review endorsed in Roe, 3' and
that the doctrine of stare decisis required lower courts to follow the opin-
29. The petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the provisions on substantive due
process grounds, arguing that the state restrictions constituted "deprivations of personal lib-
erty and autonomy." Brief for Petitioners & Cross-Respondents at 40, Casey (Nos. 91-744 &
91-902). The petitioners' Supreme Court brief quoted Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), in which he stated that "the full scope of the liberty
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause... includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints." Id. (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
30. Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1328.
31. Id. at 1397. The district court held that the abortion rights defined in Roe remain
undisturbed, id at 1396-97, requiring that regulations significantly limiting the fundamental
right to abortion be "narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest." Id at 1373-74.
The court held that the informed consent, parental consent, spousal notification, and most of
the reporting requirements failed this test and thus were unconstitutional. Id. at 1396. Never-
theless, the court held that certain sections of § 3214 were constitutional, including the re-
quirements that the marital status of the woman be reported without identifying the individual
patient by name. Id. The court struck down, however, the requirement that the name of the
referring physician and the basis of the physician's medical judgment be reported. Id.
32. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d. 682, 719 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
33. 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983). In Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490,
529-30 (1989), Justice O'Connor rejected the argument that the challenged regulation was
unconstitutional based on the standard she articulated in Akron L She stated that the provi-
sion did "not impose an undue burden on a woman's abortion decision." Id. at 530
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
34. The court of appeals cited Webster and Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990),
as creating uncertainty as to whether a majority of Justices still adhered to Roe's strict scrutiny
standard of review. Casey, 947 F.2d at 687-88.
35. Casey, 947 F.2d at 697.
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ion of "the Justice or Justices who concur on the 'narrowest grounds.' 9P36
Although only Justice O'Connor had adopted the undue burden stan-
dard, the court of appeals identified it as the middle ground between ra-
tional basis and strict scrutiny review.37 Under Justice O'Connor's
standard, strict scrutiny is required only when a regulation creates an
undue burden on a woman's right to abortion. If the regulation does not
create an undue burden, its validity is to be analyzed using the rational
basis test.38
Applying Justice O'Connor's standard, the court of appeals held
that the informed consent, parental consent, and reporting and public
disclosure provisions did not place an undue burden on a woman's abor-
tion decision.39 The spousal notice requirement, however, was unconsti-
tutional;4° the court noted that "[b]ecause of the nature of the marriage
relationship and the emotional character of human response to preg-
nancy and abortion, the number of different situations in which women
may reasonably fear dire consequences from notifying their husbands is
potentially limitless."41 The court concluded that a woman's fear of
these consequences constitutes an undue burden on her abortion deci-
sion; the regulation thus requires judicial strict scrutiny.42 While includ-
ing the spouse in the abortion decision may be a legitimate state interest,
the court held it not compelling.43
The Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals' decision on the
Pennsylvania provisions, agreeing that all of the restrictions, with the
exception of the spousal notification requirement, were constitutional.44
36. Id. at 693.
37. Id. at 698.
38. To survive strict scrutiny review, regulations limiting fundamental rights must be nar-
rowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
Under rational basis review, however, a law need only be rationally related to a valid state
objective to be constitutional. Id. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)).
39. Casey, 947 F.2d at 719. Because the court of appeals found that the provisions did not
create an undue burden, the provisions would only have to be rationally related to legitimate
state interests to be constitutional. The court held that this test was satisfied. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 713.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 715. Judge Alito dissented from the holding that the spousal notification re-
quirement created an undue burden, reasoning that the plaintiffs had failed to carry their bur-
den under a facial attack to the validity of the provision. "Section 3209 does not create an
'absolute obstacle' or give a husband 'veto power.' Rather, this provision merely requires a
married woman desiring an abortion to certify that she has notified her husband or to claim
one of the statutory exceptions." Id. at 722 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
44. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2833.
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At the same time, by a five-to-four vote, the Court reaffirmed Roe's basic
holding-that a woman has a constitutional right to an abortion up to
the point of viability. 5
The majority opinion, written jointly by Justices O'Connor, Ken-
nedy, and Souter, and joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens,46 reaf-
firmed what it called the three essential holdings of Roe: the
fundamental nature of a woman's right to abortion prior to fetal viability,
the state's right to restrict abortions after viability with exceptions for
pregnancies endangering the woman's life or health, and the state's legiti-
mate interests from the beginning of pregnancy in protecting the health
of the woman and the life of the fetus.47
The majority identified the rights to liberty and privacy protected by
45. Id.
46. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter also wrote an opinion rejecting Roe's trimes-
ter framework and adopting the undue burden standard as the appropriate standard of review.
Id. at 2816-22 (plurality opinion).
Justice Stevens dissented from the holding that all of the informed consent requirements
were constitutional, although he stated that the requirement that the physician inform the
woman of the nature and risks of the procedure and of the medical risks of carrying a child to
term is not designed to influence a woman's choice and is thus constitutional. Id. at 2841
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He argued that the informed consent
requirements, including the 24-hour waiting period, constitute an undue burden on a woman's
right to obtain an abortion. Id at 2843 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Stevens concluded that while he agreed that the parental consent requirement with an
appropriate judicial bypass was constitutional, he would not join the section of the joint opin-
ion upholding Pennsylvania's requirement because its approval was based on reasons given in
the section of the joint opinion upholding the informed consent requirements. Id. at 2843
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens joined in the holding
that reporting and public disclosure requirements were permissible. Id. at 2832-33 (plurality
opinion).
Justice Blackmun did not join the section of the joint opinion rejecting the trimester
framework and adopting the undue burden standard. He instead called for the continued use
of strict scrutiny and the trimester framework. Id. at 2847-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). He stated that, in his view,
the Court erred in not striking down all of the Pennsylvania regulations at issue. Id. at 2845
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice White, and Justice Thomas concurred in
the judgment upholding the parental consent, informed consent, and reporting and public dis-
closure requirements but dissented from the judgment striking down the spousal notification
requirements. Id. at 2873 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
In sum, seven Justices agreed that it is constitutional for states to require doctors to give
certain information to women 24 hours before undergoing abortions and to require that a
pregnant minor obtain the consent of one parent as long as a judicial bypass option is available.
All but Justice Blackmun agreed that states may impose reporting requirements on clinics
performing abortions as long as the names of patients are kept confidential. There was no clear
majority view, however, on the appropriate standard of review for analyzing such statutory
provisions.
47. Id. at 2804.
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the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as the source of the
constitutional right to an abortion:48
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela-
tionships, child rearing, and education.... These matters, in-
volving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and au-
tonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.49
The majority buttressed this view by indicating that in certain respects
the decision to obtain an abortion is similar to the decision to use contra-
ceptives, a decision that had been afforded constitutional protection
based on the right of privacy as articulated in Griswold v. Connecticut,"0
Eisenstadt v. Baird,5" and Carey v. Population Services International.2
48. Id. "Privacy," though not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution, is an implied as-
pect of liberty. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 83.
49. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807 (citations omitted).
50. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court in Griswold struck down a Connecticut statute for-
bidding the use of contraceptives, as violative of the right to marital privacy. Id. at 485. The
Court recognized that the Bill of Rights creates zones of privacy which the Court must protect
against inappropriate governmental intrusions. "We do not sit as a super-legislature to deter-
mine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs,
or social conditions. This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of husband
and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation." Id. at 482.
51. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).. The Court in Eisenstadt extended the constitutional right to use
contraceptives to unmarried persons. Id. at 453. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the
Court, stating that a state law restricting the use of contraceptives to married couples violated
the Due Process Clause:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital
relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellec-
tual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child.
Id
52. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). The Carey Court struck down a New York law criminalizing the
distribution, by anyone, of contraceptives to minors under age 16, id. at 699 (plurality opin-
ion), limiting to licensed pharmacists the distribution to persons over age 16, id. at 689-91, and
also criminalizing the advertisement or display of contraceptives. Id. at 700. Justice Brennan,
delivering the opinion of the Court, declared that "[tihe decision whether or not to beget or
bear a child is at the very heart of [a) cluster of constitutionally protected choices." Id. at 685;
see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down a ban on inter-racial mar-
riages); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (recognizing that the state may not
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The Casey majority stated that the doctrine of stare decisis required
that Roe be reaffirmed.53 Casey marks the intersection of two lines of
decisions-one protecting liberty in intimate relationships, as exemplified
by Griswold, and the other based on the principles of personal autonomy
and bodily integrity recognized, for example, in Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Department of Health,54 which limited governmental power to re-
quire medical treatment.5 The Court stated that the foundation of Roe
remains sound in both lines of cases56 and that preserving the legitimacy
of the Court required that Roe be reaffirmed: 7
Because neither the factual underpinnings of Roe's central
holding nor our understanding of it has changed .... the Court
could not pretend to be reexamining the prior law with any
justification beyond a present doctrinal disposition to come out
differently from the Court of 1973. To overrule prior law for
no other reason than that would run counter to the view re-
peated in our cases, that a decision to overrule should rest on
some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case
was wrongly decided. 8
The majority stated further that to overrule Roe in the face of political
enter the private realm of family life); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942)
(establishing that rights related to marriage and procreation are fundamental); Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (recognizing parents' rights to send their children to
private rather than public schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing
that parents have a liberty interest in educating their children in a language other than Eng-
lish). The Court refused to extend this right to privacy to include homosexual sodomy in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The Court upheld a state statute criminalizing
homosexual sodomy, saying that the act was not one of the traditional values protected by the
Bill of Rights. Id. at 192-94.
53. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808.
54. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
55. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2810. In Cruzan, the Court recognized that individuals have a
constitutionally protected liberty interest to refuse unwanted medical treatment, although
states could require clear and convincing evidence of a patient's desire to have artificial nutri-
tion and hydration discontinued. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287-88.
56. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2810.
57. Id. at 2815. The Casey majority also cited reliance by persons on the continued appli-
cation of a rule of law as a factor that must be considered before it may be overruled.
[Flor two decades of economic and social developments, people have organized inti-
mate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their
places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contra-
ception should fail. The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and
social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproduc-
tive lives .... [W]hile the effect of reliance on Roe cannot be exactly measured,
neither can the certain cost of overruling Roe for people who have ordered their
thinking and living around that case be dismissed.
Id. at 2809.
58. Id. at 2813-14.
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pressure absent strong legal justification "would subvert the Court's le-
gitimacy beyond any serious question."5 9
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter articulated a proposed re-
formulation of Roe in a joint opinion.' The Justices rejected Roe's tri-
mester framework as overly rigid in its approach to defining the
respective interests of the pregnant woman and the state. 61 The joint
opinion characterized the trimester framework as misrepresenting the
pregnant woman's interest and undervaluing the state's interest in poten-
tial life.62
The joint opinion identified the time of fetal viability as the point at
which a state's interest becomes sufficiently compelling that it may re-
strict a woman's right to abortion. 3 The joint opinion also adopted the
undue burden standard for reviewing the constitutionality of abortion
59. Id. at 2815.
60. Id at 2816 (plurality opinion).
61. Id at 2818 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor has long viewed the trimester frame-
work with dissatisfaction. In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416,
452 (1983), Justice O'Connor stated that
neither sound constitutional theory nor our need to decide cases based on the appli-
cation of neutral principles can accommodate an analytical framework that varies
according to the 'stages' of pregnancy, where those stages, and their concomitant
standards of review, differ according to the level of medical technology available
when a particular challenge to state regulation occurs.
Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
62. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818 (plurality opinion).
63. Id at 2816 (plurality opinion). Under the trimester framework announced in Roe, the
state's interest in protecting potential human life becomes compelling at viability, and states
may prohibit abortions during the third trimester except when the life or health of the mother
is threatened. Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973). During the first and second trimesters, how-
ever, the state may not interfere with the abortion decision. Id. The Casey joint opinion stated
that, as noted by the Roe Court, viability "is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of
maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817 (plurality
opinion). Because of medical advances, viability is now possible before the start of the third
trimester, so that adopting viability as the point at which the state interest in protecting poten-
tial life becomes compelling could allow states to proscribe abortions at an earlier time than
would be possible under the trimester framework. Claudia Wallis, Abortion, Ethics and the
Law: Advancing Technology Further Complicates a National Dilemma, TIME, July 6, 1987, at
82. Justice O'Connor noted this in 1983 when she stated that "[t]he Roe framework ... is
clearly on a collision course with itself." Akron, 462 U.S. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Medical technology has improved greatly since Roe was decided, improving the odds that
premature babies weighing less than two pounds will survive. Jon Van & Peter Gorner, Medi-
cal Gains Test Abortion Arguments, CH. TRIB., Apr. 26, 1989, at 1. Even so, few fetuses
survive outside the womb at less than 24 weeks after conception. Id. The use of viability as a
yardstick for allowing state abortion restrictions may create uncertainty due to the great varia-
tions in the technology available at medical facilities, meaning that premature babies who may
be viable at some modem medical centers would not be at less well-equipped facilities. In
addition, future medical advances could mean that viability will occur much earlier in preg-
nancy. Wallis, supra, at 82. The Casey joint opinion noted this uncertainty in medical technol-
ogy, stating that "there may be some medical developments that affect the precise point of
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restrictions." It noted that "[a] finding of an undue burden is a short-
hand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect
of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abor-
tion."6 The Justices stated that if a regulation does not impose a "sub-
stantial obstacle" to a woman's right to choose abortion, it will be upheld
if reasonably related to legitimate goals such as persuading a woman to
choose childbirth over abortion or protecting the health of a woman. 66
Justice Blackmun, the author of the Roe majority opinion, praised
the joint opinion as "an act of personal courage and constitutional princi-
ple,"'67 but criticized its authors for rejecting the trimester framework
and strict scrutiny review. According to Justice Blackmun, the Roe
framework remained the appropriate method for analyzing abortion re-
strictions.69 Applying a strict scrutiny analysis, he noted, would result in
a finding that all of the Pennsylvania provisions at issue in the case were
unconstitutional.7"
Justice Stevens concurred in striking down the spousal notification
requirement71 and upholding the reporting requirements for abortion fa-
cilities. 72 He criticized the joint opinion, however, for rejecting the tri-
mester framework.73 In addition, Justice Stevens dissented from the
portions of the judgment upholding all of the informed consent require-
viability . . .but this is an imprecision within tolerable limits." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817
(plurality opinion).
64. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820 (plurality opinion).
65. Id. (plurality opinion).
66. Id. at 2821 (plurality opinion). Under the undue burden standard, any regulation that
does not pose an undue burden must be only reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.
Id. (plurality opinion). By contrast, strict scrutiny requires that regulations must be narrowly
drawn to serve a compelling state interest. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
67. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judg-
ment in part, and dissenting in part).
68. Id. at 2847 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
69. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissent-
ing in part). Justice Blackmun, who created the Roe trimester framework, Roe, 410 U.S. at
163-64, stated that strict scrutiny offers the greatest protection of a woman's right to make
reproductive decisions and noted that no majority of the Court has ever agreed to an alterna-
tive standard. "The factual premises of the trimester framework have not been undermined,
and the Roe framework is far more administrable, and far less manipulable, than the 'undue
burden' standard adopted by the joint opinion." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2848 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
70. Id. at 2850 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
71. Id. at 2843 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. Id. at 2832-33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. Id. at 2839 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ments, arguing that the Court previously had struck down similar re-
quirements designed "to prejudice a woman's choice."74 Justice Stevens
also would have declared unconstitutional the twenty-four hour waiting
period because, in his view, it failed both parts of the undue burden
test.7
5
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia, White, and
Thomas, called for the outright reversal of Roe.76 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist stated his belief that "Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and
should be overruled consistently with our traditional approach to stare
decisis in constitutional cases."'77 The Chief Justice stated further that
Justice Scalia, Justice White, Justice Thomas, and he would have upheld
all of the challenged provisions, applying the approach and standard of
review adopted by the Webster v. Reproductive Health Services78
plurality. 79
Justice Scalia called Roe "plainly wrong"8 and criticized the joint
opinion's undue burden standard as being an "amorphous concept" that
has been applied inconsistently by the Court.8" He noted that "[t]he ulti-
mately standardless nature of the 'undue burden' inquiry is a reflection of
the underlying fact that the concept has no principled or coherent legal
basis."82 Justice Scalia also criticized the majority for not recognizing
74. Id at 2841 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See infra note 146
for a discussion of a prior case striking down state informed consent requirements, Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986).
75. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2843 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Although Justice Stevens used the undue burden analysis in discussing the informed consent
requirements, he stated that the actual meaning of a standard can be understood only by re-
viewing the cases in which it is applied. Id. at 2843 n.6. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). He "discounted" Justice Scalia's comments on the standard as well as the
joint opinion's discussion of the test. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). While not endorsing the joint opinion's formulation of the test, Justice Stevens left open
the door to future use of an undue burden standard:
The future may also demonstrate that a standard that analyzes both the severity of a
regulatory burden and the legitimacy of its justification will provide a fully adequate
framework for the review of abortion legislation even if the contours of the standard
are not authoritatively articulated in any single opinion.
Id (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. Id. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
77. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
78. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
79. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2855 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
80. Id. at 2873 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and Thomas joined Justice Scalia's opinion.
81. Id at 2876 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
82. Id. at 2878 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
that the abortion issue should be decided in the state legislatures across
the country, rather than by a federal tribunal.83
The Casey Court's reaffirmation of several key aspects of Roe's hold-
ing was just the latest chapter in a continuing struggle for control of the
Court on the issue of abortion rights. For nearly two decades the pres-
sure had been building on the Court to overturn Roe. Each new appoint-
ment to the Court raised the stakes as the Roe dissenters sought to gain
enough allies to create a majority that would give states broad latitude to
enact abortion restrictions. But as the parties on both sides of the abor-
tion issue marked the twentieth anniversary of the landmark case in
1993, the foundation of Roe remained intact.
The Roe Court's enunciation of abortion rights 4 marked the culmi-
nation of a line of cases recognizing the right to privacy with respect to
reproductive freedom. 5 The decision effectively invalidated abortion
laws in forty-nine states and the District of Columbia.86
Roe concerned a Texas statute that made obtaining an abortion a
crime except for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.87 Jane
Roe, 8 a single woman, alleged that she could not obtain a legal abortion
in Texas because her life was not endangered by her pregnancy. "She
83. Id. at 2885 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part md dissenting in part).
"[B]y banishing the issue from the political forum that gives all participants, even the losers,
the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an honest fight, by continuing the imposition of a rigid
national rule instead of allowing for regional differences, the Court merely prolongs and inten-
sifies the anguish." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the joint opinion "beats a wholesale retreat from the sub-
stance" of Roe. Id. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part). Chief Justice Rehnquist further criticized the joint opinion, stating:
The sum of the joint opinion's labors in the name of stare decisis and "legitimacy" is
this: Roe v. Wade stands as a sort of judicial Potemkin Village, which may be
pointed out to passers by as a monument to the importance of adhering to precedent.
But behind the facade, an entirely new method of analysis, without any roots in
constitutional law, is imported to decide the constitutionality of state laws regulating
abortion.
Id. at 2866-67 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
84. 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973). Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court in Roe,
joined by six other members of the Court-Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Douglas, Bren-
nan, Stewart, Marshall, and Powell. Justices White and Rehnquist dissented. On the same
day it announced its Roe decision, the Court by the same 7-2 vote struck down sections of a
Georgia abortion law requiring that abortions be performed only in accredited hospitals, that
the procedure be approved by a hospital staff abortion committee, and that the performing
physician's judgment that an abortion be performed be confirmed by two other physicians.
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 201-02 (1973).
85. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
86. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 13.
87. Roe, 410 U.S. at 117-18.
88. Jane Roe was a pseudonym. Id. at 120 n.4.
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claimed that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague and...
abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth amendments."8 9
After declaring that "only personal rights that can be deemed 'fun-
damental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are included in
this guarantee of personal privacy," 90 Justice Blackmun, in his opinion
for the Court, reasoned that the right to abortion is fundamental. 91 Any
laws dealing with abortion must be narrowly drafted to achieve a com-
pelling state interest.92 Justice Blackmun stated that "[iln a line of deci-
sions.., the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Con-
stitution."93 Justice Blackmun wrote that the Court or individual Jus-
tices have found the roots of the right of privacy in the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth amendments and "in the penumbras of the
Bill of Rights." 94 The Roe Court declared that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was the source of the right to abortion, but left open to future de-
bate the question whether the right could be attributed as well to other
constitutional sources. 95
89. Id. at 120.
90. Id at 152 (citations omitted) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
91. Id. at 155.
92. The decision as to the nature of the right abridged and the appropriate standard of
review to apply to the statute often effectively decides the outcome of a case.
The Supreme Court rarely finds such compelling necessity [required under a strict
scrutiny analysis] .... If the Court decides to treat a right as "fundamental," that
right becomes very difficult to abridge. An abridgment of a fundamental right is
almost never upheld. On the other hand, if a right is not deemed fundamental, virtu-
ally any government action that abridges that right is upheld. Government is free to
abridge a nonfundamental right for almost any reason.
TRIBE, supra note 1, at 11. Under the less stringent rational basis standard of review, a gov-
ernment regulation need only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. See
Richard G. Wilkins et al., Mediating the Polar Extremes: A Guide to Post-Webster Abortion
Policy, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 403, 419-21.
93. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 153. Justice Blackmun wrote:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as
the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the
people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent.
Id In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart wrote that the Court's decisions "make [it] clear
that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," thus characterizing
abortion as a right based on personal liberty. Id. at 169 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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The Court rejected the argument that a woman has an absolute right
to an abortion throughout her entire pregnancy. 96 At some point in
pregnancy, declared the Court, the respective interests of the woman and
the state shift so that the state's interest becomes sufficiently compelling
to sustain regulation of the abortion decision.9 7 "Each [of the compelling
interests] grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a
point during pregnancy, each becomes 'compelling.' "98 The Court
found state interests in protecting the health of the pregnant woman and
in protecting the potentiality of human life,99 and divided pregnancy into
trimesters to mark the points when those interests become compelling."c
During the first trimester, "the attending physician, in consultation with
his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in
his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If
that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion
free of interference by the State."1 ° During the second trimester the
state would be free to regulate abortion "to the extent that the regulation
reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal
health."10' 2 In the final trimester the state may restrict or prohibit abor-
tion, but must permit the procedure where it is necessary to "preserv[e]
... the life or health of the mother. °10 3
The years following Roe were marked by a series of challenges to
state statutes that pushed the limits of the Roe framework. In Planned
96. Id. at 153.
97. IML at 162.
98. Id at 162-63.
99. Id. at 162. While recognizing the state's interest in protecting potential life, the Court
held that the rights of pregnant women could not be overridden through state regulations
effectively "adopting one theory of life [over another]." Id
100. Id. at 163.
101. Id
102. Id The Court stated that the goal of preserving and protecting the woman's health
becomes compelling at the end of the first trimester because prior to this point abortion is less
hazardous to the mother than childbirth. Id
103. Id. at 164-65. Justice Rehnquist strongly criticized the majority's trimester frame-
work in his dissent, saying that "the Court's sweeping invalidation of any restrictions on abor-
tion during the first trimester is impossible to justify under" the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. Id. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He stated that "(t]he decision here to
... outline the permissible restrictions the State may impose in each [trimester], for example,
partakes more of judicial legislation than it does of a determination of the intent of the drafters
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist
completely rejected the majority's imposition of strict scrutiny review along with its designa-
tion of abortion as a fundamental right implicit in the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment: "[Liberty is not guaranteed absolutely against deprivation, only against depri-
vation without due process of law. The test traditionally applied in the area of social and
economic legislation is whether or not a law such as that challenged has a rational relation to a
valid state objective." Id. at 172-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth,1" the Court struck down a Missouri
statute containing a spousal consent requirement l s and a blanket paren-
tal consent requirement for unmarried women under the age of eight-
een.1 6 The Court also struck down a prohibition of an abortion
procedure commonly used during the second trimester 0 7 and a require-
ment that physicians attempt to preserve the life and health of the fetus
regardless of the stage of pregnancy.108 The Court did, however, uphold
the statute's definition of viability,109 and also a provision requiring the
pregnant woman to sign a consent form prior to obtaining an abortion.110
In 1983, a majority of six Justices explicitly reaffirmed Roe in Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (Akron I),111 striking down mu-
nicipal ordinances requiring informed consent with a twenty-four hour
waiting period, parental consent, hospitalization for second-trimester
abortions, and compliance with certain guidelines for the disposal of fe-
tuses.1 12 In his majority opinion, Justice Powell noted the political pres-
sure to retreat from Roe, but stated that respect for the doctrine of stare
decisis required Roe's reaffirmation.113 Akron marked Justice
O'Connor's first articulation of her "'undue burden" standard of re-
view"' as a middle ground between the stringent strict scrutiny standard
104. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
105. Id. at 69. This requirement challenged the Roe Court's holding that the state could
not regulate first trimester abortions. Justice Blackmun wrote that "since the State cannot
regulate or proscribe abortion during the first stage, when the physician and his patient make
that decision, the State cannot delegate authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to
prevent abortion during that period." Id.
106. Id. at 74. As with the spousal notification requirement, the Court held that the state
may not delegate veto power to a third person. Id. The Court did stop short of saying that
every minor is capable of giving informed consent regardless of age or maturity, and in Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976), decided on the same day as Danforth, the Court left open the
possibility that a parental notification requirement with a judicial bypass procedure would be
constitutional. Id. at 147-48.
107. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 79. The statute prohibited the use of saline amniocentesis as a
method of abortion during the second trimester on the grounds that it "is deleterious to mater-
nal health." Id. at 76. The Court held that the prohibition of the technique was an "arbitrary
regulation designed to inhibit... the vast majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks." Id. at
79.
108. Id. at 83.
109. Id. at 63; see supra note 17.
110. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 66-67.
111. 462 U.S. 416, 420 (1983).
112. Id. at 452.
113. Id. at 420 n.1.
114. Justice O'Connor noted:
Our recent cases indicate that a regulation imposed on a "lawful abortion 'is not
unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion.' " In my
view, this "unduly burdensome" standard should be applied to the challenged regula-
tions throughout the entire pregnancy without reference to the particular "stage" of
1993] ABORTION 1803
and the easily satisfied rational basis test.l1 ' In her dissenting opinion,
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice White and Justice Rehnquist, at-
tacked the Roe trimester framework as "a completely unworkable
method of accommodating the conflicting personal rights and compelling
state interests that are involved in the abortion context." '116 Justice
O'Connor wrote that the state's interest in protecting the potentiality of
human life is present throughout pregnancy,117 a view the majority char-
acterized as "wholly incompatible with the existence of the fundamental
right recognized in Roe v. Wade." '118
Sixteen years after Roe, the Court marked a turning point in its
treatment of abortion cases: Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Services1 19 demonstrated a new willingness
to allow individual states to restrict access to abortion.120 Webster in-
volved a challenge to a Missouri law containing "findings" that life be-
gins at conception and requiring, before an abortion, various tests to
determine the gestational age, weight, and lung maturity of any fetus that
pregnancy involved. If the particular regulation does not "unduly burde[n]" the fun-
damental right, then our evaluation of that regulation is limited to our determination
that the regulation rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose.
Id. at 453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
473 (1977) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1977))). Applying the undue burden
analysis involves two steps. First, the challenged regulation must be analyzed to determine
whether it places such an undue burden on a woman's right to abortion. If not, the provision
must merely be rationally related to a legitimate state interest to be found constitutional. If it
does create an undue burden, however, the provision would be subjected to strict scrutiny
review under which the provision must be substantially related to a compelling state interest.
Id.; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4-8,
Akron (No. 81-746) (calling on the Court to adopt the undue burden standard of review in
abortion law cases).
115. Wilkins et al., supra note 92, at 432-36. Professor Wilkins has praised the undue
burden test as returning policymaking authority to state legislatures. Id. at 435-36.
In several cases prior to Akron I, the Court had used the phrase "unduly burdensome" to
describe the type of abortion restrictions against which the Roe framework was designed to
protect. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), Justice Powell stated, "Roe did not declare an
unqualified 'constitutional right to an abortion' .... Rather, the right protects the woman
from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her
pregnancy." Id. at 473-74 (emphasis added); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 148
(1976) (stating that the Court need not determine in that case at what point consent require-
ments for minors become "unduly burdensome").
116. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 454. (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see supra note 61 and accompa-
nying text.
117. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 459 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 421 n.1.
119. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). It is interesting to note that while still an Associate Justice,
Chief Justice Rehnquist was one of the two Roe dissenters, but that sixteen years later, as Chief
Justice, he had gained enough support for his position to comand a majority in Webster.
120. See Mark E. Chopko, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: A Path to Constitu-
tional Equilibrium, 12 CAMPBELL L. REv. 181, 219-20 (1990).
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a physician has reason to believe is at least twenty weeks old. 121 In the
majority opinion joined by Justices White, Kennedy, O'Connor, and
Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that Roe "implie[d] no limitation
on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth
over abortion" and that the statute's preamble "can be read simply to
express that sort of value judgment." 122 The majority also upheld a pro-
hibition on the use of public facilities and employees to perform abor-
tions as being permissible under the Constitution, reasoning that "the
State's decision ... to use public facilities and staff to encourage child-
birth over abortion 'places no governmental obstacle in the path of a
woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy.' 123
A three-Justice plurality in Webster rejected the court of appeals'
interpretation, which had been that the statute unconstitutionally re-
quired doctors to perform all of the tests in all circumstances to deter-
mine whether a fetus is viable.1 24 The plurality attacked Roe's trimester
framework as rigid, and therefore inconsistent with "the notion of a Con-
stitution cast in general terms," 1 25 but stated that Roe need not be over-
ruled at this time.1 26 They distinguished the statute at issue in Webster,
which stated that viability is the point at which the state's interest in
protecting potential life becomes compelling, from the statute in Roe,
which criminalized all abortions except those performed to save a
mother's life.1 27 In so doing, Justice Blackmun charged, the plurality
opened the door for states to enact statutes challenging the basic founda-
tion of the right of abortion as enunciated in Roe.128
121. Webster, 492 U.S. at 501. The statute also prohibited public employees from perform-
ing or assisting in the performance of abortions not necessary to save the mother's life, as well
as the use of public facilities for such abortions. It also prohibited "the use of public funds,
employees or facilities for the purpose of 'encouraging or counseling' a woman to have an
abortion not necessary to save her life." Id. The statute further required that all Missouri
laws be interpreted to provide unborn children with rights enjoyed by other persons, subject to
the Federal Constitution and Supreme Court precedent. Id.
122. Id. at 506.
123. Id. at 509 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980)).
124. Id. at 514 (plurality opinion). The three members of the Court joining in the plurality
opinion were Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and Kennedy. Id. at 499.
125. Id. at 518 (plurality opinion).
126. Id. at 521 (plurality opinion).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 538 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun
argued that Webster "implicitly [invited] state ... legislature[s] to enact more and more re-
strictive abortion regulations in order to provoke more and more test cases." Id. (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The plurality opinion is filled with winks, and nods, and knowing glances to those
who would do away with Roe explicitly, but turns a stone face to anyone in search of
what the plurality conceives as the scope of a woman's right under the Due Process
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Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, disagreed with the plu-
rality that the viability tests conflicted "with any of the Court's past deci-
sions concerning [the] state regulation of abortion[s]," contending that
there was no need to reexamine Roe as the plurality had done.129 Justice
Scalia's concurrence, by contrast, stated that the Court should reexamine
and overrule Roe, noting that the Court often has spoken more broadly
than necessary in order to announce a new rule of constitutional law.1 30
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall criticized the plurality's
analysis, saying that it completely disregarded the basic foundation of
Roe: the Court's recognition of the fundamental right to terminate a
pregnancy.13 1 In so doing, Justice Blackmun continued, the plurality ef-
fectively repudiated every principle for which Roe stands.1 32
Webster left the Court without agreement by a majority on the
proper standard of review to apply in cases dealing with statutes restrict-
ing abortions. Of the original seven Justices favoring strict scrutiny in
Roe, only Justice Blackmun, Justice Brennan, and Justice Marshall re-
mained on the Court when Webster was decided.
In Hodgson v. Minnesota,1 33 the Court struck down a Minnesota
statute requiring that any woman under the age of eighteen notify both
parents at least forty-eight hours before undergoing an abortion.1 34 A
separate plurality opinion written by Justice Kennedy, however, upheld
an alternative provision of the statute requiring parental notification but
including a judicial bypass procedure in the event that enforcement of the
provision without a judicial bypass was enjoined.1 35 In a concurrence
Clause to terminate a pregnancy free from the coercive and brooding influence of the
State.
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
129. Id. at 525 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). "When
the constitutional invalidity of a State's abortion statute actually turns on the constitutional
validity of Roe v. Wade, there will be enough time to reexamine Roe. And to do so carefully."
Id. at 526 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
130. Id. at 533 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
131. Id. at 556 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132. Id. at 556-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Ste-
vens argued in his opinion that the statute's definition of conception implied regulation not
only of pre-viability abortions, but also of common forms of contraception such as the IUD
(intrauterine device) and the "morning after pill," and that the preamble containing the defini-
tion, therefore, would be unconstitutional under Griswold, without implicating Roe. Id. at
565-66 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
134. Id. at 450-55. The Court held that the two-parent notification requirement without a
judicial bypass option was unconstitutional. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
O'Connor joined Justice Stevens to create the majority.
135. Id. at 495-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Kennedy's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice
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making her the fifth vote in favor of upholding the provision, Justice
O'Connor applied her undue burden standard. She reasoned that if a
judicial bypass option was provided, the two-parent notification require-
ment did not unduly burden a minor's limited right to an abortion.1 36
In Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (Akron 11), 137 de-
cided on the same day as Hodgson, the Court refused to restrict further
the power of states to impose parental notification requirements. 38 The
Court upheld a statute making it a crime for a physician to perform an
abortion on an unmarried minor without providing notice to one of the
parents. 139 Although the statute provided a judicial bypass procedure, it
required the minor to present clear and convincing proof of her maturity
to make the abortion decision. 14°
While not explicitly overruling Roe, the Court's opinions in Web-
ster, Hodgson, and Akron 11 broadened states' powers to regulate abor-
tion and raised questions as to Roe's continued vitality. In addition, the
changing composition of the Court, especially the appointments of Jus-
tices Souter and Thomas to replace Justices Brennan and Marshall-
both members of the original Roe majority-led to some expectations
that the Court was only waiting for the proper vehicle to overturn
Roe."' Casey, it was widely believed, could provide such a vehicle.' 42
Far from resolving the complex issues regarding state regulation of
abortions, however, the Casey opinion leaves the future of abortion rights
clouded with uncertainty. What is clear is that the Court, as currently
Scalia. Justice O'Connor concurred to create the majority upholding the two-parent notifica-
tion requirement with a judicial bypass. Id. at 461 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment in part).
136. Ide (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part). Justice
O'Connor stated that "[in a series of cases, this Court has explicitly approved judicial bypass
as a means of tailoring a parental consent provision so as to avoid unduly burdening the mi-
nor's limited right to obtain an abortion." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment in part).
137. 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
138. Id. at 518-19.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 507-08. To obtain a judicial bypass, a minor had to present clear and convinc-
ing evidence that she had sufficient maturity and information to make the abortion decision,
that one of her parents had engaged in physical, emotional, or sexual abuse against her, or that
notice was not in her best interest. Id. at 508-09. The Court held that the parental notice
requirement did not unconstitutionally burden a minor's right to an abortion. Id. at 517-18.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy stated that "[i]t would deny all dignity to the family
to say that the State cannot take this reasonable step in regulating its health professions to
ensure that, in most cases, a young woman will receive guidance and understanding from a
parent." Id. at 520.
141. Savage, supra note 9, at Al.
142. Laurence H. Tribe, Write Roe Into Law, N.Y. TIMEs, July 27, 1992, at A17.
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composed, is unlikely to uphold an outright ban on abortion in the early
stages of pregnancy. It is not clear, however, exactly how far states may
go in making abortions more difficult to obtain before the Court finds an
undue burden, thus triggering strict scrutiny review. Furthermore, the
coalition of liberal and moderate Justices that reaffirmed Roe is fragile
and based its decision on stare decisis and the need to maintain the
Court's legitimacy rather than on an endorsement of the legal theories
underlying Roe. 143 The Casey majority was created only by the shift of
Justice Kennedy from the Webster plurality's rational basis approach to
the more centrist position of Justice O'Connor.144
While ostensibly upholding Roe's basic principle that women have a
fundamental right to obtain pre-viability abortions, the Court approved
abortion provisions more restrictive than at any previous time in the
post-Roe era.'15 Casey also overruled the earlier decisions in Akron I and
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,46
143. Robert Bork, whose unsuccessful nomination to the Supreme Court in 1987 enabled
Justice Kennedy to join the Court and provide the pivotal vote reaffirming Roe, has criticized
the Casey majority's approach as having no basis in the Constitution:
"Institutional integrity" turns out to mean the Court must not overturn a wrong
decision if there has been angry opposition to it. Nothing is said of the possible
perception that the Court reaffirms such a decision because there has been angry
support for it. There being political forces on both sides, principles of institutional
integrity would seem to counsel deciding the case on the merits.
Robert H. Bork, Again, a Struggle for the Soul of the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1992, at A19.
144. Chief Justice Rehnquist, believing that he could count on the support of Justice Ken-
nedy along with Justices Scalia, White, and Thomas, drafted a majority opinion that would
have given states considerable power to enact abortion restrictions. Savage, supra note 9, at
Al. When voting on the Pennsylvania restrictions in the Court's chambers, Justice Kennedy
indicated that he was not prepared to overturn Roe but that the Pennsylvania restrictions
seemed reasonable. Id. Justice Kennedy, who was raised to believe that abortion was a terri-
ble evil, hoped to avoid having to make the ultimate decision as to the constitutionality of
abortion, but was left with no choice when Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated that he planned
to write a majority opinion giving states broad leeway to enact statutes to protect potential life.
Id. Justice Kennedy then announced that he would join Justices O'Connor and Souter in
affirming the basic right to abortion. Id.
145. See infra note 148.
146. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Akron L The Pennsylvania statute strnck down in Thornburgh required a woman consider-
ing abortion to be informed of the physician's name, possible detrimental physical and psycho-
logical effects, possible medical risks of the procedure, probable gestational age of the fetus,
medical risks of carrying a child to term, medical benefits available to help cover childbirth
and related expenses, and the father's potential liability for assistance with the child's support.
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 760-61. In addition, the statute mandated that the woman be in-
formed as to the availability of printed materials describing the fetus and a listing of agencies
offering alternatives to abortion. Id. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun stated that
"[t]his is not medical information that is always relevant to the woman's decision, and it may
serve only to confuse and punish her and to heighten her anxiety, contrary to accepted medical
practice." Id. at 762.
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which struck down informed consent requirements characterized by the
Court in Akron I as "designed not to inform the woman's consent but
rather to persuade her to withhold it altogether." '147 Casey upheld the
Pennsylvania requirements that women be informed not only of the risks
of the procedure but also of the probable gestational age of the fetus.148
Despite the Casey Court's greater deference to specifically expressed
state interests, statutes banning abortions in most situations cannot be
upheld even under Casey's reformulation of the Roe framework. Roe's
trimester framework delineated the periods of pregnancy at which the
competing interests become compelling. 149 The Roe Court held that a
woman has a fundamental right to obtain an abortion during the first and
second trimesters, subject only to regulation by the state to protect the
health of the mother during the second trimester. 150 Casey reaffirmed
this basic holding of Roe that the right to abortion is fundamental in the
early stages of pregnancy,1 5' although the Casey joint opinion held that
fetal viability rather than the end of the second trimester is the point at
which a state's interest becomes compelling. 152 The Casey joint opinion
also adopted the undue burden test as the standard of review to be used
in abortion cases." 3 Thus, reading Roe and Casey together, a woman has
a fundamental right to obtain a pre-viability abortion, a right that may
not be subjected to undue burdens by state laws.
The Court appeared to underline its resolve by denying certiorari in
the case of Ada v. Guam Society of Obstetricians & Gynecologists.' 4 The
147. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983).
148. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823 (plurality opinion). Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Ken-
nedy wrote in their joint Casey opinion that:
To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when the gov-
ernment requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information
about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth,
and the "probable gestational age" of the fetus, those cases go too far, are inconsis-
tent with Roe's acknowledgement of an important [state] interest in potential life,
and are overruled.... If the information the State requires to be made available to
the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be permissible.
Id. (plurality opinion).
149. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
150. Id. at 164.
151. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
152. Id at 2816 (plurality opinion).
153. Id at 2820 (plurality opinion).
154. 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992). Dissenting from the denial of certiorari, Justice Scalia, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, contended that the lower court erred in declar-
ing the law unconstitutional on its face, saying "there are apparently some applications of the
statute that are perfectly constitutional." Id. at 634 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia con-
tended that
[flacial invalidation based on overbreadth impermissibly interferes with the state pro-
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Court declined to consider the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision
to strike down Guam's abortion statute, 5' which allowed abortions only
if two physicians practicing independently determined that continued
pregnancy would threaten the life or "gravely impair" the health of the
mother, or in cases of ectopic pregnancies.15 6 The law made no excep-
tions for rape or incest.
The denial of certiorari in the Guam case marked the first time in
twenty years that the Court had declined to hear a major abortion
case. ' 7 Only three Justices voted to hear the case, not including Justice
Thomas or any of the five members of the Casey majority.158 Justice
Thomas' decision not to join the dissenters may have reflected a tactical
decision designed to limit the effect of the Court's order rather than an
actual change in position. 15 9
Some states, including Louisiana"6 and Utah, 1 6 1 have enacted stat-
cess of refining and limiting... statutes that cannot be constitutionally applied in all
cases covered by their language.... Under this Court's current abortion caselaw,
including Casey, I see no reason why the Guam law would not be constitutional at
least in its application to abortions conducted after the point at which the child may
live outside the womb.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992).
156. Id. at 1368.
157. Dick Lehr, Overrule of Abortion Ban Allowed to Stand; High Court Won't Hear Case
on Sweeping Guam Statute, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 1992, at 1.
158. Id. Only four votes are required for a grant of certiorari. Had Justice Thomas joined
with the three dissenters-Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and White-to force
the issue, the five members of the Casey majority simply could have voted to affirm the court of
appeals. Affirming the lower court decision would have created a legal precedent, while the
decision not to hear the case allows proponents of anti-abortion laws to argue that the Court
did not actually decide the validity of the Guam law. Id.
159. Id
160. The Louisiana statute criminalizes the administration or prescription of "any drug,
potion, medicine, or any other substance to a female," or the use of "any instrument or exter-
nal force whatsoever on a female" "with the specific intent of terminating pregnancy." LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:87(A) (West Supp. 1992). Exceptions to the statute allow termination
of a pregnancy to preserve the life or health of the unborn fetus, to remove a dead fetus, to save
the life of the mother, and for pregnancy resulting from rape or incest. The rape and incest
exceptions are also subject to the requirements that the victim report the rape or incest to law
enforcement officials and that the abortion be performed within the first 13 weeks of preg-
nancy. Further, rape victims must obtain a physical examination within five days of the rape
to determine whether the woman was pregnant prior to the rape. Id. § 14:87(B). Sentences of
not less than one nor more than ten years of imprisonment at hard labor and fines of not less
than $10,000 nor more than $100,000 are imposed on persons convicted of performing an
abortion. The penalties do not apply to women obtaining abortions. Id. § 14:87(E).
161. The Utah Code allows abortions only to save the life of the mother, to terminate a
pregnancy resulting from a reported rape or from incest if the abortion is performed within the
first twenty weeks of pregnancy, to prevent grave damage to the pregnant woman's medical
19931 ABORTION 1809
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
utes that effectively eliminate the right to abortion except for cases of
rape and incest or to protect the life or health of the mother. While
providing a somewhat larger window of availability for abortions than
the Guam statute, the statutes are incompatible with Roe and Casey.162
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit struck down the
Louisiana statute 63 subsequent to the Casey decision, saying that the
statute, "on its face, is plainly unconstitutional under Casey because [it]
imposes an undue burden on women seeking an abortion before viabil-
ity." ' " Despite the Court's refusal to hear the Guam case, Louisiana has
filed a petition for certiorari. 165
In a challenge to Utah's statute, Jane L. v. Bangerter,166 the United
States District Court for the District of Utah held that the Act was not
void for vagueness and did not violate the First Amendment's Establish-
ment or Free Exercise Clauses or the right to freedom of speech; nor did
it violate the right to freedom of speech, or the Thirteenth Amendment's
prohibition on involuntary servitude. 67 The judge delayed ruling on a
privacy challenge to the Act until after the Court's Casey decision.' 61
Should the four Casey dissenters gain new allies with the appoint-
ment of new Justices in coming years, statues similar to those from Loui-
siana and Utah could be held to be constitutional.1 69 The election of
health, or to prevent the birth of a child with profound defects. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302
(Supp. 1992). Persons performing unauthorized abortions are guilty of a third-degree felony,
but women obtaining unauthorized abortions are not subject to criminal sanctions. Id. § 76-7-
314. The statute also includes parental and spousal notification and informed consent require-
ments. Id. §§ 76-7-304, 76-7-305 (1990).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 149-53.
163. Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27, 31 (5th Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed, 61
U.S.L.W. 3481 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1992) (No. 92-1066).
164. Id.
165. Petition for Certiorari, Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27, 31 (5th Cir. 1992), (No.
92-1066), published at 61 U.S.L.W. 3481 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1992).
166. 794 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1992).
167. Id. at 1542-49. In addition to other claims, the plaintiffs took the novel approach of
challenging the abortion regulations on Thirteenth Amendment grounds, alleging "prohibiting
elective abortions forces women into 'slavery' or 'involuntary servitude' by carrying a child to
term." Id. at 1549. Judge Green dismissed the claim, saying "[i]t strains credulity to equate
the carrying of a child to term with 'compulsory labor,' and the argument borders on the
frivolous." Id.
168. Challenge to an Abortion Law is Set Back, N.Y. TIMEs, April 11, 1992, § 1, at 6.
169. Justice Blackmun, the author of the Roe opinion, has indicated that the future of
abortion rights may well be decided when his successor is appointed. "I cannot remain on this
Court forever, and when I do step down, the confirmation process for my successor may well
focus on the issue before us today. That, I regret, may be exactly where the choice between the
two worlds may be made." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2854-55 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
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President Clinton,17 ° however, who has promised to appoint Justices sup-
porting abortion rights, makes it unlikely that the group of Justices seek-
ing to overrule Roe will be able to garner the necessary fifth vote in the
near future. 171
The Court recently denied certiorari in a case challenging a Missis-
sippi law requiring doctors to counsel women on alternatives to abortion
followed by a twenty-four hour waiting period, a decision that may pro-
vide some indication of what types of abortion restrictions the Court will
tolerate. 172 The Court's denial of certiorari carries no precedential value,
of course, but in refusing to hear the case, the Court declined the oppor-
tunity to clarify what constitutes an undue burden. Abortion rights law-
yers argued that the particular circumstances in Mississippi, a rural state,
meant that the law, on its face, placed an undue burden on women. 173
Despite the Court's refusal to hear the case, the law may still be chal-
lenged "as applied," once evidence exists of how the waiting period actu-
ally affects access to abortions. 174
Casey failed to resolve many issues related to what laws states may
enact to regulate abortions. The likely result will be a new wave of state
restrictions, similar to those approved in Pennsylvania, that make abor-
tions more expensive and difficult to obtain. 75 Although it is clear that
170. A Brighter Day for Choice, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1992, at A28.
171. Savage, supra note 9, at Al. One Justice, speaking on condition of anonymity, said
after the Casey decision that the "battle is over. It will never be overturned now." Id.
172. Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992).
173. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Decline to Hear Mississippi Abortion Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 1992, at A22.
174. Id.
175. According to 1988 figures, 83% of all counties in the United States lack an abortion
provider. Charles Leroux, Frozen Opinions-19 Years Later, Abortion Issue Entangles Court,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 9, 1992, § 4, at 1. Professor Laurence Tribe described what he sees as the
likely result of Casey:
The five Justices who made history in Casey by refusing to overrule Roe, and who
wrote so forceful a defense of the basic principle that women must be free to choose,
unfortunately gave a green light to every state and city to restrict abortion in any way
that judges appointed by Presidents Ronald Reagan and Bush do not find an "undue
burden."
The result of this newly weakened protection for the right to choose.., was that
women seeking abortion might now be subjected to long delays, repeated and costly
trips to distant cities and heightened exposure to harassment and even violence by
groups like Operation Rescue.
Tribe, supra note 142, at A17.
While Casey may encourage new activity in legislatures across the country as states enact
more restrictive abortion laws, the decision also has spurred calls on Congress to move for-
ward with the Freedom of Choice Act of 1992, S. 25, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (reintro-
duced as the Freedom of Choice Act of 1993, S. 25, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)), an attempt
to write Roe into federal law. The Freedom of Choice Act would prohibit states from restrict-
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the Court cannot uphold state laws banning pre-viability abortions under
Casey, 176 a more difficult question remains unanswered by the case: At
what point do restrictions such as longer waiting periods or more inten-
sive counseling become unduly burdensome on a woman's choice? 177
The critical aspect of the analysis is what constitutes a "substantial obsta-
cle." How will the Court define "substantial?" Will the Court apply a
consistent definition to the term, or will it, as Justice Scalia contended in
Casey, merely highlight certain facts in the record and announce that an
undue burden does or does not exist? 178 This lack of certainty undoubt-
edly will lead to new variations of restrictions, more litigation, and even
more animosity between the parties to this deeply divisive issue.
Even though Casey left undefined the exact parameters of what con-
stitutes an undue burden, it reaffirmed the Roe holding that abortion is a
fundamental right in the early stages of pregnancy. Nor did the Court
undercut Roe by adopting a rational basis standard of review that would
allow states to enact abortion restrictions that are merely rationally re-
lated to legitimate state interests. Since Casey, the Court has declined to
hear cases from Guam and Mississippi, supporting the view that, while
some abortion restrictions are constitutional, outright bans on abortion
will not be upheld. In addition, the election of a president who supports
abortion rights solidified the view that Roe's basic premises are unlikely
to be overturned in the foreseeable future. 179
The landmark 1973 ruling of Roe v. Wade, as reformulated in Casey,
retains its validity even as it hangs by the thread of a single vote. Far
from settling the question of the extent of the constitutional right to
abortion, however, the Court's decision in Casey to uphold most of Penn-
ing the right of a woman to choose to have an abortion before fetal viability. The Act would
allow states to restrict access to abortions after viability except when necessary to protect the
life or health of the woman. The Act would also allow states to impose requirements on
abortions if such requirements are medically necessary to protect the life or health of women
undergoing abortions. Id. Congressional leaders had planned to rush the Act through both
houses prior to the 1992 presidential election, in order to present it to President Bush, who had
vowed to veto the bill. WEDDINGTON, supra note 19, at 269. The reaffirmation of the basic
Roe principles in Casey, however, dissipated the sense of urgency, and the Act has yet to come
to a floor vote. Nat Hentoff, The Fading Freedom of Choice Act, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1992,
at A19.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 149-53.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
178. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
179. Savage, supra note 9, at Al. President Clinton marked the twentieth anniversary of
Roe on January 22, 1993, by signing memoranda lifting the Title X "Gag Rule" which re-
stricted abortion counseling at federally-funded clinics, 58 Fed. Reg. 7455 (1993), ending the
ban on fetal tissue research, id. at 7457, revoking prohibitions on the importation of the French
"abortion pill," RU-486, id. at 7459, and allowing privately-funded abortions at overseas U.S.
military hospitals. Id. at 6439.
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sylvania's restrictions, combined with the uncertainty of the undue bur-
den standard, is certain to invite further court battles and continuing
erosion of Roe. Instead of deciding the abortion issue once and for all,
Casey marks but another chapter in a fiery debate dividing the nation, a
chapter likely to intensify the passions and efforts of those on each side of
the abortion controversy. The Casey majority demonstrated deep con-
cern that caving in to political pressure might severely damage the
Court's legitimacy. Rather than defusing political pressure, however, the
Casey Court by failing to give a definitive statement on the status of abor-
tion rights in America, may in fact only have energized the competing
forces in the abortion controversy. The Court boldly announced that it
had reaffirmed the principle of Roe that women have a right to abortions
during the early stages of pregnancy, but in reality, Roe's promise of a
universally available fundamental right and its requirement that abortion
regulations receive strict judicial scrutiny are distant memories. While
Roe theoretically remains valid after Casey, the ability of women to exer-
cise the right to obtain abortions is almost certain to become more diffi-
cult as states copy and expand upon the Pennsylvania provisions upheld
by the Court. As a result, the rights guaranteed under Roe ultimately
may become meaningless.
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